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Abstract
The hypothesis that marriage increases men’s earnings has contributed to legisla-
tive support for the Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI). However, previous studies
of this phenomenon have not controlled for many relevant characteristics that
select men into marriage, nor have they focused on low-income, unmarried
fathers—the population targeted by HMI. We use the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study, which measures many previously unobserved confounders, to
test for a relationship between marriage and earnings. We use a variety of analytic
strategies to control for selection (including differencing and propensity scores)
and find no evidence of an effect of transitions to marriage on the earnings of
unmarried fathers that differs from zero, either for the full sample or subsamples
defined by race–ethnic category and baseline cohabitation status. © 2009 by the
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
It is a well-established empirical finding that married men have higher earnings
than unmarried men. Does marriage itself cause this “marriage differential” or can
the disparity be explained by the fact that, even before the event, men who marry
differ from those who do not in ways that also lead them to earn more in the future?
The mechanism behind the observed association between marriage and men’s
earnings has been a central issue in family policy debates, most recently with regard
to the Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI). For instance, one of HMI’s flagship demon-
strations, Building Strong Families (BSF), targets couples who share a nonmarital
birth and raise their (common) children together. Because of the instability of these
arrangements and the risk for poorer child and family outcomes (so-called “fragile
families”; see Carlson, McLanahan, & England, 2004; Mincy, 1994; Mincy & Pouncy,
1997), BSF provides support to help them strengthen their relationships and form
and sustain healthy marriages (Amato, 2007; Dion et al., 2003). If marriage induces
higher earnings for fathers in this population, and if BSF successfully promotes mar-
riage, then this could lead to a reduction in child poverty (Thomas & Sawhill, 2002).
Some argue, however, that relationship instability and other problems among
poor and minority, unmarried parents are reasons to be skeptical that marriage will
produce positive outcomes for these parents or their children (Furstenberg, 2007).
For instance, there is considerable evidence that the shortage of men with stable
jobs in low-income, minority populations reduces the marriage prospects for low-
income, single mothers (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1993; Harknett & McLanahan, 2004;
Lichter, Leclere, & McLaughlin, 1991; Lichter et al., 1992; South & Lloyd, 1992;
Wilson, 1987). Further, Edin and Kefalas (2005) propose that a low-income, single
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mother is looking for a father with sufficient earnings to help her acquire the
amenities associated with middle class status, including a car and a home. In this
case, differential selection into marriage may be at the root of the earnings differ-
ential between married and unmarried men, particularly with respect to disadvan-
taged men. Moreover, these mechanisms argue for providing different types of
intervention. For example, several researchers have suggested that, in addition to
relationship support services, HMI should attempt to increase the skills and earn-
ings of unmarried fathers (Carlson, Garfinkel, et al., 2004; Carlson, McLanahan, &
England, 2004; Mincy & Dupree, 2001).
In this paper we address this debate using new data and methods to attempt to
identify the causal effect of transitions to marriage for a sample of relatively disad-
vantaged fathers. These men are initially unmarried, although either romantically
involved or cohabiting with the mothers of their children. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review of previous literature on 
the marriage differential, along with its limitations. We then highlight the contribu-
tions of our paper by describing our sample and methods. Next, we present the results
of our analyses followed by a discussion of our findings and their policy implications.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Hypotheses to Explain the Marriage Differential
On average, married men have higher earnings than unmarried men (Antonovics &
Town, 2004; Stratton, 2002). It is possible that this differential is caused solely by
the differential characteristics that select men into and out of marriage. However,
several hypotheses also exist regarding how marriage might cause (at least part of)
this differential. The most prominent explanation for the effect of marriage on
men’s earnings is that specialization in market production by men and household
production by women leads married men to spend more time at work than unmar-
ried men, resulting in higher wages (Becker, 1965, 1973, 1981; Mincer, 1962;
Parsons, 1943, 1949). Moreover, the wages of men employed in high-status occupa-
tions (for example, politician and college professor) may reflect rewards for the
uncompensated labor of their wives (Gallagher, 2003; Kanter, 1993; Papaneck, 1973).
Several alternative causal explanations for the marriage differential do not
involve specialization. Employers may discriminate in favor of married workers
because they know married men have families to support and consequently predict
that they will work harder (Bartlett & Callahan, 1984). Besides higher wages, mar-
ried men may also have higher earnings than unmarried men because they work
more hours. Kenny (1983) argues that they do so because of a greater perceived
need for income. Nock (1998a) argues that they do so to conform to a social script
requiring married men to protect and provide for wives and children, which is
reflected in and enforced by law, custom, and religious practice. Finally, according
to Nock (1998b), marriage provides men with social capital of the kind Coleman
(1988) describes, including access to the family and friends of his wife who can help
them locate jobs. In the social network literature, these contacts can also provide
jobseekers with recommendations from sources employers trust, thereby improving
their chances of being selected among many candidates for higher paying jobs
(Aguilera, 2003, 2008; Neckerman & Fernandez, 2003). By this logic, fathers who
transition to marriage may have higher earnings than those who remain single,
through the social capital that marriage provides.
The impact of marriage on earnings, should it exist, may vary by race–ethnicity
or cohabitation status. Previous work suggests that marriage will have a smaller
impact on the earnings of black than white husbands because, other things equal,
black women work more hours and have higher labor force participation rates than
white women, which makes specialization in market work more difficult for these
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men (Rodgers & Stratton, 2005). Marriage may have a smaller impact on the earn-
ings of black than white husbands because the male–female wage gap is smaller
among black than white workers (Burstein, 2007; Daniel, 1992). Concerning cohab-
itation, Daniel (1992) and Loh (1996) predict that cohabiting men will earn more
than noncohabiters (but less than married men) because they devote more time to
market work. On the other hand, if higher wages (or larger wage increases) make
men more attractive as cohabiting partners, then the cohabitation differential will
be at least partly due to selection.
Finally, the aforementioned explanations imply a marriage differential for unmar-
ried fathers who later marry the mothers of their children. Nock (1998b) hypothe-
sizes that by delaying or refusing marriage, some unmarried fathers avoid taking
full responsibility for their children and do not comply with the social norms that
tend to make married fathers work harder and longer. We could make a corollary
argument about specialization. After marrying the mothers of their children, for-
merly unmarried fathers are able to specialize in market work more than their
counterparts who remain single, which raises their wages.
Wives’ characteristics may also affect her husbands’ earnings differentials. Edin
and Kefalas (2005) argue that some mothers are more likely to marry after they
have established financial independence through steady employment and owner-
ship of a car, a home, or both. Gassmen-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006) interpret
experimental evidence of the long-term effects on marriage of New Hope—a program
that increased employment and income among low-income unmarried mothers—as
evidence in support of this hypothesis. After marriage, such mothers are less 
likely than nonworking mothers to specialize in home production while their hus-
bands specialize in market work. Thus, transitions to marriage with steadily
employed mothers should result in smaller earnings differentials for men than tran-
sitions to marriage with nonworking mothers (Chun & Lee, 2001; Daniel, 1992;
Loh, 1996)
Most researchers do acknowledge the possibility, however, that at least some
proportion of these differentials reflects selection into marriage based on charac-
teristics associated with earnings (such as health, mental health, and history of
incarceration) that may or may not be observed (Nakosteen & Zimmer, 1997).
Empirical Work to Date on the Marriage Differential
To identify the causal effect of marriage we must compare the future earnings of
men who do not marry with the future earnings of equivalent men who do marry.
While most researchers would agree that randomized experiments are the gold
standard for causal inference, in practice, the statistical literature suggests that we
can also identify some causal effects by controlling for all characteristics of the two
groups, so-called confounding covariates, that are related to both the likelihood of
marriage and the level of future earnings (Rubin, 1978). This paper presents analyses
that attempt to identify the causal effect of marriage on earnings for a subpopula-
tion of men. While we can never know for sure whether the required assumptions
have been met for such identification, what we can do is to be clear about what
those assumptions are so that the reader can assess their plausibility.
Early studies of the marriage differential used cross-sectional data and standard
earnings equations with marital status dummy variables. Like the early cross-
sectional studies (see Hill, 1979), Ginther and Zavodny (2001) found that married
men earned about 16 percent more than never-married men. They find no evidence
of selection after controlling for premarital conceptions, which they argued increased
the likelihood of marriage relative to men without such conceptions. Nock (1998b),
focusing on fathers, controlled for premarital births, risky behavior, cognitive skills in
some models, and sibling fixed effects in other models. His results suggest little evi-
dence of selection on sibling-specific unobserved characteristics. More recently,
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Antonovics and Town (2004) attempted to control for selection using a cross-
sectional sample of monozygotic twins and found no evidence of selection on twin-
specific unobserved characteristics.
Two studies explicitly modeled the process that selected some men into marriage.
After estimating a standard earnings equation with a Heckman-type selection term,
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) found no evidence of selection on unobserved vari-
ables. Chun and Lee (2001) used a switching regression model with an endogenous
marital selection equation and two additional equations that accounted for wage
penalties related to wives’ labor hours (a proxy for specialization). Relying on
restrictive assumptions about the covariance matrix, they also found no evidence of
selection on unobserved variables.
Differencing (or fixed effects) models, the most widely recognized approach to
date, use panel data (for example, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) 
to “difference out” unobservable characteristics that may predict both marital sta-
tus and earnings. Typically, these results are then compared to cross-sectional
results, with equivalence purportedly suggesting that there is no selection on unob-
servables. This approach does assume, however, that any unobserved confounders
do not change over time. Moreover, without further assumptions, differenced esti-
mates apply only to a subset of the population (the subset for whom marital status
changed over the given time period), whereas cross-sectional analyses usually apply
to the entire population that the sample represents. Therefore, these comparisons
might be misleading.
Almost all studies that used differencing techniques to estimate the causal effect
of marriage on earnings found minor support at best for the selection hypothesis
(Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996; Stratton, 2002). An exception, Cornwell
and Rupert (1997) concluded that up to one-third of the total marriage differential
observed in the cross-sectional data was due to selection. They attributed their
unusual result to their use of a younger sample than Korenman and Neumark
(1991), with more first marriages than divorces represented among those who expe-
rienced marital transitions.
Several studies found support for variations in the earnings differentials by race
and union status. Hill (1979), Daniel (1992), Loh (1996), and Rodgers and Stratton
(2005) found that the marriage differential for black men was lower than the mar-
riage differential for white men. Daniel (1992) and Cohen (1999) found that black
men had lower cohabitation differentials than white men. More generally, studies
found that the marriage differential was larger than the cohabitation differential
and, except for Stratton (2002), both differentials remained statistically significant
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using individual or sibling fixed
effects (Daniel, 1992; Loh, 1996). Finally, to test his hypothesis that unmarried
fathers who postponed or refused marriage had lower earnings than other men,
Nock (1998b) regressed earnings on the age at which unmarried fathers had their
first child and several control variables that might select men into unmarried father-
hood. He found that men who fathered a child outside of marriage in their mid-20s
had significantly lower earnings than childless men. However, this association
became insignificant once he controlled for subsequent marriage or cohabitation.
Contributions of Our Work to the Literature
The objective of this study is to attempt to estimate the causal effect of transitions
to marriage on earnings for unmarried fathers who are cohabiting or romantically
involved with their child’s mother. Using new data and methods, we improve on pre-
vious studies by: (1) focusing on an understudied population of men who are
primarily racial–ethnic minorities and disadvantaged; (2) examining whether the
marriage differential is greater for unmarried fathers with stronger partner bonds—
cohabiters, the likely targets of the HMI; (3) investigating whether the marriage
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differential varies by racial–ethnic group; (4) controlling more exhaustively for
selection bias and other threats to validity; and (5) isolating the effect of potential
marriage on the earnings of unmarried fathers, rather than estimating the effect of
marriage across the entire sample.
We operationalize these aims with a combination of refinements in both data and
methods. First, to address aims (1) through (3) we use data from the richly detailed
longitudinal Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS). This allows us
to examine a population of relatively disadvantaged men who, though ignored in
previous studies of the marriage differential, are now the primary targets of the
HMI. The survey’s racially/ethnically diverse cohort consists of 3,600 initially
unmarried couples and their children. Some parents cohabit, while some have
looser relationships. These features allow us to investigate subgroup differences
between white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic fathers and between residential
(cohabiters) and nonresidential (romantically involved) fathers. The relatively
recent data reflect current conditions among a population that can be difficult to
study due to its changing demographic characteristics.
We address aims (4) and (5) in two ways. First, the richness of the FFCWS data
allows us to address selection bias by accounting for a myriad of confounding char-
acteristics that have not typically been used in the previous literature. Besides the
standard earnings equation variables, we have data on a broad array of health, fam-
ily, and socioeconomic characteristics, and two structural variables concerning
unemployment rates and child support enforcement. Further, we take advantage of
the longitudinal nature of the FFCW data to properly control for the temporal
ordering of birth, confounding covariates, marriage, and earnings. Second, we
attack selection bias using several different methods. One of these approaches (the
propensity score strategy) allows us to directly target a more relevant population
when drawing conclusions about the likely impact of marriage.
Our results are consistent across varying sets of assumptions about the selection
mechanism. In brief, using methods designed to address selection bias and applied
to this relatively disadvantaged population, we are never able to reject the hypoth-
esis that the effect of transitions to marriage on earnings, for any subgroup or over-
all, is zero. That is, there is not enough evidence to state with confidence that these
effects differ from zero.
DATA AND MEASURES
Data
Our data came from the first four waves of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study (FFCWS) (Reichman et al., 2001). The FFCWS followed a cohort of 4,700
(3,600 nonmarital and 1,100 marital) newborns and their parents. The births occurred
in 75 hospitals in 20 cities across the United States; the nonmarital births were repre-
sentative of such births in large American cities (population greater than 200,000).
Baseline data collection took place from spring 1998 through fall 2000. Follow-up
interviews were conducted with both parents when the focal child was one, three,
and five years of age.
Baseline interviews were available for 78 percent of eligible fathers and about 10
percentage points less than that at subsequent waves. Although the FFCWS
obtained data from mothers about fathers, making missing data less problematic,
not all mothers provided precise estimates of fathers’ earnings. To address the issue
of missing data, we use Multiple Imputation (MI) (Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 1997). MI
is increasingly used to account for nonresponse in administrative and large-scale
data sets—for example, the National Center for Health Statistics, the Department of
Transportation, and the Federal Reserve Bank. MI uses observed data from study
participants to replace missing values with imputed data that reflect both sampling
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uncertainty and uncertainty about the imputation model. These imputed values are
used to construct several complete data sets (based on a prediction model). It is
important to note that MI relies on weaker (that is, more plausible) assumptions
about how the missing data came to be, as compared to complete case analysis (list-
wise deletion) and other standard approaches (Little & Rubin, 2002). Sinkewicz
(2006) provides a comparison of methods, including MI, which account for missing
data in the FFCWS. Details about the scope of missing data in our study and our
MI method are provided in Appendix C.1
Measures
This section provides a summary description of the variables in our analyses. A
detailed, model-specific discussion of the temporal ordering of the variables is pro-
vided in the Methods section.
Outcome Variable
The primary outcome variable in this study is respondents’ regular annual earnings
for paid work in the year prior to the interview (informal earnings are not included
in this measure). While both earnings and wages have been used as outcomes in pre-
vious studies, we use (the natural log of regular annual) earnings because many of
the marriage-differential hypotheses have implications for both wages and hours
worked. Although specialization, the hypothesis of primary interest to economists,
is expected to affect wages, it is only one of several explanations for the marriage dif-
ferential. Other hypotheses, such as social norms, social capital, and employer dis-
crimination in favor of married workers, could explain why married men work more
hours or weeks or why they have better employment opportunities than unmarried
men. We also conducted analyses using employment as the outcome variable. The
results, which are available upon request, are similar to those reported here.
Potential Causal Variable, Marriage
The causal variable of interest is the father’s relationship status with the mother of
the focal child, defined as: married, cohabiting, or romantically involved but not
cohabiting with the mother of the focal child. At the baseline interview, all fathers
in our sample were unmarried, although either cohabiting or romantically involved
with the mother. We compare the earnings of fathers who subsequently transitioned
to marriage with those who remained unmarried. We also make use of the cohab-
iting versus romantically involved distinction (resident versus nonresident) to per-
form subgroup analyses, as described in the Methods section.
Confounding Covariates
Our analyses attempt to explicitly control for a range of characteristics (hereinafter
called confounding covariates) of the unmarried fathers (or the mothers of their
children) that we hypothesize to be predictive of both the probability of getting
married and subsequent earnings. We group these variables into three sets.
Set (A) includes variables that usually appear in standard earnings equations. These
variables, which we derive from fathers’ self-reports, include: a continuous measure
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of age, along with age-squared, and age cubed;2 race–ethnic group (three categories:
non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic);3 education (four categories:
less than high school, high school diploma or GED, some college, and college gradu-
ate); region of U.S. residence (four categories: Northeast, Midwest, South, or West)
and dichotomous measures of nativity (whether the father is U.S. born) and addi-
tional training (government sponsored, vocational, technical, or military).
Set (B) confounders include additional self-reported fathers’ characteristics. These
variables fall into four categories: family characteristics, health and development,
economic and social characteristics, and structural factors. Family characteristics
include: number of children (0, 1 or 2, and 3 or more), multiple partner fertility
(yes/no), father suggested an abortion (yes/no), and father’s name is on the birth cer-
tificate of the focal child (yes/no). Health and development variables include: a
dichotomous indicator of self-reported health (poor/good); a scale of depressive
symptoms derived from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies of Depression (CES-D)
(Radloff, 1977) (0  low, 84  high); drug and/or alcohol problems (yes/no); a scale
measuring intelligence, derived from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised
(WAIS-R) (1981) (0  low, 16  high); and a scale measuring the psychopathology of
each of the father’s parents (0  low, 12  high). Appendix A4 contains a comprehen-
sive explanation of the depression scale, the indicator of drug/alcohol problems, the
scale of parental psychopathology, and the intelligence scale. Economic and social
characteristics include: continuous measure of regular annual earnings; continuous
measure of informal/underground earnings; employment status (yes/no); car
ownership—a proxy for wealth (yes/no); father provided prenatal cash or in-kind sup-
port; engagement in illegal activities, for example, stolen goods, drugs, or hustles
(yes/no); incarceration history (yes/no); and a dichotomous measure of religiosity. Set
(B) confounders also include two community-level variables: the city unemployment
rate and an indicator of the strength of the child support enforcement policy in the state.
We measure all Set (B) variables at baseline, with two exceptions. Multiple-partner
fertility and incarceration were not measured until the one-year follow-up survey. Both
variables may have been influenced by the treatment (marriage) for those fathers who
married in the first year, which would bias our results. At the same time, omitting
these variables would represent a different source of bias. We decided that the latter
was the more serious risk of bias, and therefore included these variables in our mod-
els. In the end, our analyses were robust to inclusion or exclusion of these variables.
Finally, Set (C) confounders are self-reported mothers’ characteristics measured
at baseline. They include: continuous measures of age and household income and
dichotomous measures of car ownership, church attendance, employment in the
past year, financial assistance from family, and financial assistance (public or pri-
vate) with the birth. We also include an interaction between mother’s report of
household income and an indicator of whether she and the father were cohabiting
at the time of report.
METHODS
The goal of our empirical analyses is to move from a comparison of differences in
earnings across married and unmarried fathers, to an estimate of the potential effect
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of transitions to marriage on the earnings of those fathers who remain unmarried.
However, the problem with causal interpretations is that there may be unobserved
differences between those who transition to marriage and those who do not, which
drive differences in earnings.
We begin by replicating the cross-section and differencing methods predominant
in the literature and incorporating the same types of variables available in previous
studies. Then we investigate the potential efficacy of new methods to address selec-
tion. We build a bridge between the two methodological paradigms by exploring
whether the unobserved variables implicitly controlled for in the differenced analy-
ses are variables that we can control directly with our new data set. This section
describes and compares the methods from the two paradigms.
Traditional Paradigm: Standard Variables
The most common methods used in the previous literature are cross-sectional
analyses and fixed effects or differencing models. As typically used, these methods
directly control for only standard earnings equation variables, so, analogously, we
will use only those in Set (A). We use data from the third-year interview to create
comparability between the causing variable in our cross-sectional and differenced
methods and the analyses described in the next section.
Cross-Sectional Model
Our cross-sectional method simply fits regressions of the form
ln Ei  a0  axXi
A
 bMi  ei (1)
on the data from the third-year (post-birth) interview of the FFCWS, using the stan-
dard set of predictors (Set A). Here i indexes individuals, Ei is a measure of annual
earnings, Xi
A denotes the standard confounding covariates in Set (A), and Mi is the
marital status indicator. To make causal inferences, the cross-sectional method that
includes just the Set (A) covariates would require, among other assumptions (dis-
cussed below), that the variables in Set (A) comprise all confounding covariates. To
examine sensitivity of the results to the missing data approach, we estimated both
the cross-sectional and difference equations with both complete case and multiple
imputation samples. The differences between these two strategies typically were not
substantial and in no case altered statistical significance (results available upon
request).
Differenced Model
Our second method, differencing, capitalizes on the panel data in the spirit of
Korenman and Neumark (1991). We use data from both baseline and third-year
interviews to estimate the coefficient of the marital status indicator variable, as in
the following equation:
In Ei  ax
' Xi
A
 b'Mi  ei
' (2)
where i indexes individuals, Ei represents the change in annual earnings between
baseline and year 3, Xi
A denotes the change in the values of the standard con-
founding covariates (Set A) between baseline and year 3, and Mt is the change in
the marital status indicator variable between baseline and year 3. The advantage of
this method is that it has the potential to adjust for unobserved, individual-specific
confounders that do not vary over this time period.
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New Paradigm: New Variables and New Methods
This section takes full advantage of the richness of FFCWS. Additionally, we explore
the potential gains of using a semi-parametric modeling method—inverse-
probability-of-treatment weighting with propensity scores.
New Variables
We explore the impact of taking advantage of the rich set of covariates available in
FFCWS by comparing results from three groups of models that correspond to three
arrays of confounding covariates (A, A  B, A  B  C).
New Method: Inverse-Probability-of-Treatment Weighting 
Using the Propensity Score
Given that the policy questions that motivate this research revolve around programs
that attempt, in part, to support unmarried parents to transition to marriage, we focus
on the potential effect of marriage on the earnings of those we observe to be unmar-
ried three years post-birth (the so-called effect of the treatment on the controls).
Implicitly, then, we want to compare the earnings of unmarried fathers who remain
single to what their earnings would have been if they had transitioned to marriage.
Since we cannot observe the counterfactual state (earnings if they had married), we
compare these fathers to those who did transition to marriage but otherwise are sim-
ilar to them on as many confounding covariates (those baseline characteristics that
predict both the probability of marriage and subsequent earnings) as possible.
How does this work? First, define the propensity score for the ith father in our sam-
ple as the probability that he transitioned to marriage between baseline and year 3,
conditional on the full array of confounding covariates (Sets A, B, and C). Estimated
propensity scores are then, in essence, a one-number summary of all of these covari-
ates. Crucially, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that, assuming the
propensity score model is correct, properly adjusting for the propensity score is suf-
ficient to adjust for all the covariates used to create the propensity score. Therefore,
if we have measured all confounding covariates, we should be able to unbiasedly esti-
mate the targeted causal effect. This assumption of all confounders measured is
commonly referred to in the sociology and economics literatures as selection on
observables and in the statistics literature as ignorability of the assignment mechanism.
There are several different ways to control for estimated propensity scores,
including matching, subclassification, and weighting. We chose to use inverse-
probability-of-treatment weighting using propensity scores (Imbens, 2004; Kurth 
et al., 2006; Robins, 1999; Rosenbaum, 1987; Sato & Matsuyama, 2003) to re-weight
the group of fathers who transition to marriage so that, with respect to the values
of the confounders, it mirrors the sample of fathers who do not. Henceforth we
refer to this estimator as our weighted estimator. This approach has the same intu-
ition as propensity-score matching; however, weighting is typically more efficient and
also can be more stable in situations when the comparison group (married fathers) is
smaller than the group about which we want to make inferences (unmarried fathers).
Moreover, in this setting, weighting yielded better balance than matching.
To implement this strategy we first estimated propensity scores using probit
regression (other models can also be used). Weights were constructed as follows:
Unmarried fathers each received a weight of 1, and married fathers each received a
weight equal to e(x)/[1  e(x)]. This re-weights the comparison group (those fathers
who are married either at year 1 or year 3) so that it mimics, in terms of observed
confounding covariates, the original group of unmarried fathers in which we are
interested. Again, assuming we have measured all confounders and our propensity
score model is reasonable, our choice of weights can allow us to make inferences
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about what would have happened to the earnings of the group of fathers we observe
to be unmarried still by year 3 if they had married.
The effectiveness of the weighting at creating similar groups can be checked by
assessing the “balance” across groups. Specifically, we compared both the mean
and standard deviation of each covariate between the group of unmarried men and
the re-weighted comparison group of men who married between baseline and year 3.
The final propensity score model specification was chosen based on its ability to
yield weighted groups that looked the most similar.
Finally, several studies have demonstrated that using a combination of propensity
score weighting and regression is generally more effective at reducing bias than using
either method on its own (Rubin, 1979; Rubin & Thomas, 2000). Therefore, rather
than calculating a simple difference in (weighted) mean outcomes, we ran a regres-
sion of the earnings at year 5 on all confounding covariates, Xi
ABC (measured at base-
line), and the marriage indicator, Mi (reflecting changes between baseline and year 3),




 b''Mi + ei (3)
in which the weights described above were incorporated as probability weights
(similar to survey weights). We also ran standard (unweighted) regression models
with the same confounding covariates used as predictors.
Contrasting the Methods
This section provides a comparison of the analytic methods used with respect to
necessary assumptions and quantities estimated.
Temporal Ordering of Variables
Stark differences exist between analytic methods concerning the temporal ordering
of the variables (described graphically in Appendix Figure E15). The differenced
model attempts to identify causal effects by implicitly controlling for unobserved
person–level confounding covariates that stay constant over time (from baseline to
year 3). An undesirable property of this model, however, is that it may include (and
thus adjust for) post-marriage variables as well (depending on the timing of the
marriage for those fathers who got married). This may induce bias if these variables
are also affected by marriage (Rosenbaum, 1984). For instance, if a given father got
married one month after baseline and this marriage affected his subsequent train-
ing or educational attainment, which we then control for in our model, this can bias
our causal estimates. The cross-sectional model uses data from only one time point
(year 3) and thus suffers from a similar problem.
The new analytic methods take advantage of the longitudinal data to select meas-
ures that satisfy the temporal priority of the envisioned causal pathway. Therefore,
confounding covariates (with two exceptions described above) are measured at
baseline, the marriage indicator variable reflects the transition into marriage
between baseline (when no one in our sample was married) and year 3, and the
earnings outcome is measured at year 5 (the last year of our data).
Parametric Form of the Model
Even if the full set of variables represents all confounders, a linear model may be
an inappropriate parametric specification (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984). The
5 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s
Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/jhome/34787.
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primary difference between linear regression and propensity score methods is the
ability to loosen the parametric restrictions. Comparisons between (temporally sep-
arated) regression and propensity score results will yield some insight as to the
importance of this key distinction.
The differenced method imposes even stronger parametric assumptions than
non-differenced methods because the model assumes that the relationship between
the covariates and the outcome is constant over time. This means that the coeffi-
cients on the time-varying coefficients would be expected to be the same across
time periods. Moreover, this method can suffer from bias if the fathers who enter
into marriage have different earnings trajectories, conditional on covariates
included in the model, from those who do not—a scenario that could occur, for
example, if marriage was induced by a random shock in earnings.
What Is Being Estimated?
Another key distinction across methods concerns the population about which we
are able to make inferences. The propensity score method allows us to choose
weights in such a way that we can generalize our inferences either to the treatment
group, the control group, or the full sample (or the populations they represent). We
focus on the effect we consider to be of greatest interest in this setting—what the
effect of marriage would have been for those who did not initiate marriage within
the first three years after the birth of their child (the so-called effect of the treatment
on the controls). In contrast, the cross-section and regression approaches estimate
effects across the entire sample of married and unmarried fathers (the average
treatment effect). The differenced approach estimates the effect for those who get
married within the first three years (the effect of the treatment on the treated) since
it can only identify effects for those who had variation in their marital status vari-
able across time points.
Selection on Unobserved Versus Unobservable Variables
One possible advantage of the differencing method is that it has the potential to
control for unobserved characteristics of individuals that do not change over the
given time period. Thus, differences between cross-sectional and differenced results
are often considered evidence that selection on unobserved variables plays some
role in the marriage earnings differential.6 It is unclear in this setting, however, if
these characteristics are unobservable or merely typically unobserved in this litera-
ture. To investigate this question, we extend the standard cross-sectional and dif-
ferenced earnings models (Equations 1 and 2) to control for the same sets of addi-
tional confounders used in the propensity score analyses. If estimates converge
across these extended models, it suggests these additional confounders may be suf-
ficient to identify the causal effect.
Subgroup Analyses
We investigate the possibility that the causal effect of marriage on earnings varies by
key characteristics of the father. The literature on differences between cohabitation
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and marriage premiums (Daniel, 1992; Loh, 1996; Stratton, 2002) lead us to consider
the relationship status of the unmarried fathers—cohabiting, and romantically
involved but not cohabiting—as two different counterfactual states against which to
compare the married state. In keeping with this, we conduct two sets of analyses.
One set compares the married fathers to those who were cohabiting in years 1 and
3. Small cell size limitations, however, prevent us from separately estimating the dif-
ferences between married fathers and those who were not cohabiting in years 1 or
3. Therefore, the other set of analyses compares the married fathers to the full sam-
ple of fathers who are not married at years 1 or 3. Additionally, motivated by the
work of Hill (1979), Daniel (1992), Loh (1996), and Rodgers and Stratton (2005), dis-
cussed above, we allow for different marriage effects across our three race–ethnic
categories (white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic) by including interaction terms
in all our analytic models.
RESULTS
Summary Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive data for the fathers in our analyses: the married
fathers (the treatment group) and the two groups of unmarried fathers for which
we estimate models—the full sample of unmarried fathers and the subsample of
cohabiters only.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our cross-section and difference methods.
We see that fathers who marry by the year-3 interview differ in important ways from
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean/%) for cross-section and differenced analyses.
Married All Unmarried Cohabiters
(N  582) (N  2,260) (N  847)
Cross-sectional Analysis
Outcome Variable
Earnings 23,731 18,636*** 20,838***
Covariates (baseline)
Age 27.1 26.4*** 26.8
Race: White 17.7 10.1*** 11.5***
Black 41.9 62.4*** 52.0***
Hispanic 40.4 27.5*** 36.6***
U.S. born 78.6 86.7*** 80.0
Region: Northeast 22.1 24.3*** 26.8***
Midwest 23.1 29.6*** 26.4***
South 37.9 33.7*** 32.4***
West 16.9 12.4*** 14.6***
Education:  high school 27.9 36.0*** 40.4***
High school/GED 37.6 34.6*** 32.3***
Some college 29.7 27.2*** 25.6***
College grad. 4.9 2.2*** 1.7***
Training 58.1 56.8 51.6***
Differenced Analyses
Outcome Variable
Change in earnings 5,200 3,662*** 4158***
Covariates
Additional education 16.4 16.2 12.2***
Additional training 32.2 30.4*** 25.5***
Tests were conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant differences between
married fathers vs. the full sample of unmarried fathers, and married fathers vs. the cohabiting fathers
only: *** p  0.01;** p  0.05;* p  0.10.
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fathers who do not marry (compare column 1 to column 2), who, in turn, differ
from the subsample of unmarried fathers who cohabit in years 1 and 3 (column 3).
For example, at the year-3 interview, the annual earnings of fathers who marry
($23,731) are higher than those of unmarried fathers who cohabit in years 1 and 3
($20,838), which, in turn, are higher than those of the full sample of fathers who
remain unmarried ($18,636). Married fathers also have the advantage in terms of
education; the proportion of unmarried fathers reporting some post-secondary
schooling is about 6 percentage points less than the proportion of married fathers
reporting some post-secondary schooling. A similar hierarchy holds for training.
Married fathers are also slightly older on average. Further, there are noticeable
race–ethnic differences: White fathers were about 18 percent of those who marry,
but only 12 percent of those who cohabit in years 1 and 3, and 10 percent of all
fathers who remain unmarried. By contrast, black fathers are about 42 percent of
those who marry but over 50 percent of those who cohabit in years 1 and 3 and over
60 percent of all fathers who remain unmarried. All of these characteristics are con-
sistent with the higher earnings observed for married fathers.
Nevertheless, unmarried fathers are more likely to be U.S. born, more likely to
live in the Northeast, and less likely to live in the South, which might imply higher
earnings for unmarried fathers. Presumably, these effects would not be strong
enough to counteract the opposite effects of characteristics such as educational
attainment.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our propensity score weighting method.
Again, fathers who marry by their child’s first or third birth year (column 1) have
the highest earnings by their child’s fifth birth year. However, even at baseline these
fathers are also better off than those who do not marry on the same characteristics
discussed above. For instance, these married fathers are less likely to be high school
dropouts, and on average they are slightly older.
Table 2 also presents summary statistics for the fathers’ characteristics in our
extended models (Set B covariates). Importantly, we see that married fathers are
earning more and are more likely to be employed even at baseline. Moreover,
fathers who eventually marry are less likely to: father children by previous partners,
want to abort the focal child, be ex-offenders, report substance abuse problems, or
have experience with illegal employment. They are more likely to: report religiosity
(church attendance), and own a car. These characteristics are generally consistent
with the higher earnings observed among the married fathers.
Finally, Table 2 shows summary statistics for the mothers’ characteristics in our
extended models (Set C covariates). The mothers of children born to fathers who
later marry these mothers are also better off than the mothers of children born to
fathers who remain unmarried to these mothers. As compared with the latter, the
former mothers are older, have higher incomes, and are more likely to own a car
and report religiosity.
The patterns between cohabiters and the full sample of unmarried fathers in
Table 2 are not as pronounced as those between married and unmarried fathers but,
more often than not, the cohabiters appear to be slightly more advantaged. This is
noticeable, for instance, with regard to the critical confounder “baseline earnings,”
as well as “car ownership,” a proxy for wealth.
TRADITIONAL ANALYSES: STANDARD VARIABLES
Figure 1 displays the estimates of the effects of marriage on (ln) earnings at year 3,
disaggregated by race, for the traditional models (Appendix Table D17 displays these
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results in tabular form). Solid circles and hollow triangles and the associated dark
vertical lines correspond to estimates and 95 percent confidence bands from the
cross-section and differenced models, respectively. Results in the left half of the fig-
ure are from models fit to the full sample (cohabiting and romantically involved).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (mean/%) for regression and propensity score analyses.
Married All Unmarried Cohabiters
(N  665) (N  1,998) (N  1,022)
Outcome Variable
Earnings 27,940 19,928*** 21,580***
Covariates (baseline)a
Age 27.1 26.4*** 26.5***
Race: White 16.6 9.9*** 11.9***
Black 42.7 64.9*** 58.1***
Hispanic 40.7 25.2*** 30.0***
U.S. born 77.6 88.7*** 85.6***
Region: Northeast 22.4 24.6*** 26.1***
Midwest 23.1 30.4*** 29.5***
South 37.6 33.5*** 31.6***
West 17.0 11.5*** 12.8***
Education:  high school 39.6 46.1*** 46.7***
High school/GED 34.5 36.9 35.1***
Some college 21.2 15.9*** 17.1***
College grad. 4.7 1.1*** 1.0
Training 40.4 40.6 39.5
Children: Zero 47.0 41.1*** 40.8***
1 or 2 48.2 52.6*** 52.8***
3 Plus 3.8 6.3*** 6.5***
Multiple partner fertility 31.2 40.2*** 37.6***
Father suggested abortion 9.9 14.6*** 12.5***
Father’s name on birth cert. 98.6 95.9*** 97.2***
Bad health 8.2 7.7 9.2
Depressive symptoms 14.9 15.0** 13.8
Alcohol or drug problems 56.6 61.1*** 60.8***
Mother’s psychopathology 0.5 0.6* 0.6***
Father’s psychopathology 0.7 0.7** 0.7
IQ 6.2 6.2 6.1**
Father earnings 18,528 14,619*** 15,641***
Father informal earnings 1,157 1,452*** 1,448***
Father owns car 63.3 50.2 54.6***
Father gave prenatal support 98.8 96.3*** 98.1***
Father illegal activities 2.6 5.1*** 3.8***
Father’s incarceration 36.4 49.5*** 41.2***
Father’s religiosity 30.7 23.0*** 20.1***
Mother’s age 24.4 23.8*** 23.8***
Mother’s household income 27,611 22,891*** 24,052***
Mother employed last year 77.6 76.6 77.5
Financial assistance w/birth 72.0 76.9*** 75.6***
Family assistance for mother 94.8 95.5 95.1
Mother owns car 48.1 36.2*** 39.9***
Mother’s religiosity 36.2 31.2*** 28.2***
Tests were conducted to determine whether there were statistically significant differences between
married fathers vs. the full sample of unmarried fathers, and married fathers vs. the cohabiting fathers
only: *** p  0.01; ** p  0.05; * p  0.10.
a All covariates measured at the baseline interview except multiple partner fertility and incarceration
measured at the 1-year interview.
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Results in the right half of the figure are from models fit to the cohabiting sub-
sample. Each pair of lines reflects marriage effects either for white (W), black (B),
or Hispanic fathers (H). Finally, the horizontal lines (dark for cross-section, light for
differenced) reflect the bounds on 95 percent confidence intervals for the marriage
estimates aggregated across race—point estimates were omitted to avoid further
complicating the plot but can be assumed to be in the center of these intervals.
The fit of these models is quite poor. The R2 for each of the two sets of cross-
sectional models is 0.07 and for the differenced models is barely above 0. The poor
fit for the differenced models probably occurs because these models drop important
predictors such as race, age, region, and whether born in the U.S. from the analysis.
As shown in Figure 1, only two of the estimates across all analyses are statistically
significant at a 5 percent significance level. These are the cross-section estimates of
the effect of marriage on the earnings of the black fathers in our sample. They sug-
gest an approximate gain in earnings of about 115 percent for the full sample and
about 82 percent for the cohabiters, both of which seem unreasonably large. How-
ever, they are associated with large standard errors; thus, even in the absence of any
effect, these estimates would have a higher probability than estimates with rela-
tively low standard errors of having a more extreme magnitude. Moreover, the
cross-section estimates are the ones we are least comfortable interpreting causally,
given how few covariates were included, the lack of temporal separation, and the
parametric constraints of the model.
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Figure 1. Effects of marriage on year 3 (log) earnings by race (WBH) for cross-section
(dot) and difference (triangle) models. Differenced models reflect the change in log earn-
ings between baseline and year-3 interviews. The full sample indicates both cohabiting and
romantically involved fathers. W indicates white; B indicates black; H indicates Hispanic.
Results from the cross-sectional analyses by race are displayed using circles for point esti-
mates and dark solid lines for the 95 percent confidence intervals. Results from the differ-
enced analyses by race are displayed using triangles for point estimates and light solid lines
for 95 percent confidence intervals. The dark and light horizontal lines delineate the
boundaries of the 95 percent confidence intervals for main effect estimates corresponding
to the cross-section and differenced analyses, respectively.
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New Methods: New Variables
Balance Checks
As described above, a crucial step in implementing our propensity score weighting
method is checking the balance that results between the group of unmarried fathers
and the weighted group of married fathers. In the standard earnings model (Set A
covariates), it was not difficult to obtain good balance in means; however, in the two
expanded earnings models in Equation (3) we were not able to obtain balance that
met our satisfaction. When we looked more closely at the group of unmarried
fathers who consistently had propensity scores out of the range of the propensity
scores for married fathers (our comparison group), we discovered that a substan-
tial portion of these fathers (67) were unemployed, noncohabiting at baseline, and
had been incarcerated at some point in their lives. Since only seven married fathers
met these criteria, we felt there were an insufficient number of married fathers with
these characteristics to serve as counterfactuals for the corresponding unmarried
fathers. Removing these fathers created good balance in means across groups, as
illustrated by the plots of standardized difference in means of confounding covari-
ates displayed in the figures in Appendix B8 (results for comparisons of standard
deviations were excellent but are not presented here).
We believe that this finding is important in and of itself. That so few of these
unemployed, noncohabiting fathers reporting a record of incarceration end up mar-
ried means that it is probably very difficult to assess the effect of marriage on the
earnings of these fathers using observational data. Moreover, this finding points to
inherent problems in conventional linear regression models that would extrapolate
over areas where data are nonexistent or, at best, limited. Propensity score
approaches have the capacity to identify and avoid this problem.
Analysis Results
The results from the standard linear regression (dots) and propensity score
weighted (triangles) models, displayed in Figure 2, again are disaggregated by
race–ethnic group and use the natural log of earnings, this time at year 5, as the
dependent variable (Appendix Table D29 displays these same results in tabular
form). However, this plot reflects the results of our regression and weighted meth-
ods rather than our earlier cross-section and difference methods. Moreover, the six
pairs of estimate/confidence interval combinations (three race–ethnic groups by
two methods) are now replicated twice in each sample. The two replications corre-
spond to the two additional sets of confounding covariates included in the extended
earnings models. Once again, the horizontal lines (dark for linear regression and
light for the weighted) reflect the bounds on 95 percent confidence intervals for the
marriage effect estimates aggregated across race), here based on the full array of
confounders (Sets A, B, and C).
Recall that the propensity score weighted and regression estimates target effects
for different groups of individuals. The fact that these corresponding estimates are
generally quite similar across these methods lends support to the hypothesis that
the average effect of marriage across the whole sample of married and unmarried
fathers (after excluding the “unmatchable fathers”) is similar (if not equivalent to)
the effect of marriage on the unmarried.
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As measured by R2, the fit of the propensity score weighted models is nearly iden-
tical to the fit of the regression models; for example, using the full set of predictors,
the R2 is 0.17 and 0.16 (full sample and cohabiters, respectively) for the weighted
models compared to 0.16 and 0.17, respectively, for the linear regression models.
The direction of the estimates is positive for white and black fathers, and negative
for Hispanic fathers. However, none of the marriage effect estimates from the lin-
ear regression or weighted analyses for any race–ethnic group, based on either the
full sample or the cohabiting subsample, is statistically significantly different from
zero. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect of marriage on earnings for
any subgroup or overall. This may be because of large standard errors or simply
because there is no causal link. We cannot distinguish between these possibilities in
this study. We see a similar ordering of magnitude of marriage effects across
race–ethnic groups across all covariate sets. The effect size is about the same for
white and black fathers while it is smaller for Hispanic fathers. However, the dif-
ferences between these estimates are not statistically significant.
Building a Bridge: Controlling for Unobserved or Unobservable Variables?
Here we examine the impact of expanding our initial cross-section and differ-
ence analyses (as before, using data from the year 3 or both baseline and year 3,
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Figure 2. Effects of marriage on year-5 (log) earnings by race (WBH) for regression (dot)
and propensity score (triangle) strategies. Full sample indicates both cohabiting and
romantically involved fathers. W indicates white; B indicates black; H indicates Hispanic.
Standard indicates standard earnings variables (Set A); dad indicates the addition of pre-
viously unobserved father characteristics (Set B) to Set (A); mom indicates the addition
of previously unobserved mother characteristics (Set C) to Sets (A) and (B). Results from
the linear regression analyses by race are displayed using circles for point estimates and
dark solid lines for the 95 percent confidence intervals. Results from the propensity score
weighted analyses by race are displayed using triangles for point estimates and light solid
lines for 95 percent confidence intervals. The dark and light horizontal lines delineate the
boundaries of the 95 percent confidence intervals for main effect estimates from the full
model corresponding to the linear regression and weighted analyses, respectively.
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respectively) to include the two sets of typically unobserved confounders—fathers’
characteristics (Set B) and mothers’ characteristics (Set C) measured at baseline.
The results from the augmented cross-sectional and differenced methods are dis-
played in Figure 3 (Appendix Table D310 displays them in tabular form). The form
of the display is otherwise analogous to the display in Figure 2. However, in Figure
3 the results are again from cross-section and differenced models.
First, the fit of the models, as measured by R2, increases dramatically once we
include these additional predictors. After including Set (B) predictors, the cross-
section model has an R2 of 0.15 for the full sample and 0.17 for the cohabiters; after
adding Set (C) predictors, this R2 changes, for the cohabiting sample only, to 0.18.
For either expanded sets of predictors, the R2 for the differenced model jumps to
0.38 for the full sample and 0.43 for the cohabiters.
The results displayed in Figure 3 are striking. While Figure 1 indicates that the
cross-section and difference estimates are not particularly close when we include
only the standard earnings covariates (Set A) or their change in the difference mod-
els, conditioning on the additional confounders (Sets B and C), as seen in the second
and third as well as the fifth and sixth interval groupings, leads to virtually identical
point estimates in the cross-section and difference models. Note that even though
the standard errors are relatively large for these estimates, this is not relevant to the
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Figure 3. Impact of adjustment for additional baseline confounding covariates on cross-
section (dot) and difference (triangle) estimates of the effect of marriage on year-3 (log)
earnings. Full sample indicates both cohabiting and romantically involved fathers. W indi-
cates white; B indicates black; H indicates Hispanic. Standard indicates standard earnings
variables (Set A); dad indicates the addition of previously unobserved father characteris-
tics (Set B) to Set (A); mom indicates the addition of previously unobserved mother char-
acteristics (Set C) to Sets (A) and (B). 
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comparison. When we make comparisons between, for instance, different estimated
marriage effects for different race–ethnicities, the standard error is a relevant bench-
mark because the goal is to distinguish between true differences in the population
quantities these effects are trying to estimate. In this case, however, we are just try-
ing to ascertain if these methods would yield the same estimate for this sample.
These results lead us to believe that the unobserved variables for which the differ-
encing method adjusts are actually observed in the sets of extra variables we are able
to include from the FFCWS.
Moreover, the fact that the difference estimates change more dramatically than
the cross-section estimates suggests that the assumption of similar earnings trajec-
tories in the absence of marriage between men who marry and those who do not
may only hold after conditioning on these extra variables—this appears to be par-
ticularly true for the black fathers. Thus, the differenced model may be less robust
than previously assumed. These results provide support for the expanded earnings
models in the propensity score and associated regression methods (Figure 2) that
incorporated these additional variables.
CONCLUSION
Recent legislation that provides funds to support Building Strong Families, a
Healthy Marriage Initiative demonstration project targeting unwed parents, has
focused new attention on an old question: Does marriage have a causal effect on
men’s earnings? Potential answers to the “marriage differential” puzzle lie in socio-
logical theories of gender-role differentiation or economic theories about special-
ization. According to these theories, the earnings of married men increase relative
to the earnings of unmarried men because marriage creates opportunities and pres-
sures, both from within and from without the family, for men to work harder or
more intensely. For example, employers may discriminate in favor of married men.
Financial support from wives or from the friends and relatives of wives (as well as
job leads or recommendations) may enable married men to obtain better jobs or
higher wages than unmarried men.
Traditionally, testing these hypotheses has been difficult because unobservable
characteristics that select men into marriage could also explain the marriage dif-
ferential. Differencing out these unobservable characteristics is the predominant
approach used to address the selection problem in the economics literature,
although a few studies have tried to model the process that selects men into mar-
riage. We approached the selection problem with a variety of tools and a different
source of data on a more policy-relevant group of men.
Our cross-sectional point estimates of the marriage differential are on the same
order of magnitude as previous cross-sectional estimates, but are statistically signif-
icant only for black unmarried fathers. Consistent with the hypothesis that selection
plays some role, our point estimates of the marriage differential for white, black, and
Hispanic unmarried fathers decline when we difference out and condition on vari-
ables that are unobservable in most studies, or use propensity scores to take account
of selection into marriage. Further, regardless of the method we use to account for
selection (ignoring the cross-section models, which were not designed to deal with
selection), there is not enough evidence to support the claim that marriage has a
non-zero effect on the earnings of unmarried fathers. Also, while at face value the
estimates across racial–ethnic groups and cohabitation status appear to be different,
these estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other. However,
they suggest that these types of subgroup analyses may still be important in future
analyses where the sample sizes may be big enough to detect such differences.
Our inability to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of marriage could be
because the effect really is negligible, because our estimates are too imprecise to
distinguish the effect from zero, or because we have not been able to sufficiently
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control for selection bias. However, conditioning on variables that are unobservable
in most studies does at least substantially improve the fit of all the models exam-
ined. This suggests that the vast majority of the variation in the earnings of unmar-
ried fathers is not explained by marriage or the characteristics most likely to be
measured in conventional data sets. That the point estimates in the propensity score
and associated regression models are substantially smaller than the point estimates
in the cross-sectional and differenced models also suggests that differencing, the
predominant approach used to address selection, may actually lead to biased esti-
mates of the marriage differential.
The biggest contribution to reducing selection bias appears to be from the inclusion
of the new variables in the estimation models. It is difficult to gauge the impact of
properly accounting for the temporal ordering of the variables, though we also believe
it to be a crucial component of our new analytic strategy. Our work provides some evi-
dence that it may be possible to measure all of the previously unobserved variables
captured by the fixed effects models. Moreover, it suggests that the assumptions under-
lying the differenced and fixed effects methods used in the past may not have been met
with previous data. On the other hand, our results appear to be robust to the model
specification (propensity score vs. a linear model) and the choice of quantity being
estimated (treatment effect for the whole sample vs. just the unmarried men).
Finally, our propensity score sample excludes unemployed/noncohabiting/for-
merly incarcerated fathers because we could not find a sufficiently large group of
married fathers in our data with similar characteristics. Due to the lack of empiri-
cal counterfactuals, we are unable to estimate the effect of marriage on these
fathers with any confidence. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests their proba-
bility of getting married is small. Thus, there are likely to be more effective strategies
for raising earnings for this particular group of fathers than marriage promotion.
Future studies will need to consider whether there are sufficient data to make con-
vincing inferences for highly disadvantaged populations of fathers.
In sum, we conclude that even if BSF increases marriage rates and the sustainabil-
ity of those marriages, it is not clear that it would, in turn, result in higher earnings for
the fathers these programs are most likely to target. We will have to await results from
randomized experiments that evaluate BSF and other similar interventions to see
whether marriage can indeed be induced (or relationships strengthened) and whether,
in practice, such transitions translate into real changes in work and earnings.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF SELECTED COVARIATES
1. Depression Scale
An abbreviated version of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D)
is used to create a depression scale (0  low, 84  high). The CES-D is designed to
measure the frequency of depressive symptoms previously identified in the clinical
literature on depression as well as in other depression inventories (Radloff, 1977).
The shortened version of the CES-D contains 12 items that correspond to two emo-
tional components—depressed mood and psychomotor retardation. These ques-
tions pertain to symptoms of depression experienced over the past week. They
include: (1) feeling bothered, (2) poor appetite, (3) feeling blue, (4) lack of focus, 
(5) feeling depressed, (6) feeling like everything is an effort, (7) feeling fearful, 
(8) trouble sleeping, (9) talking less than usual, (10) feeling lonely, (11) feeling sad,
and (12) feeling like one cannot get going.
2. Alcohol/Drug Problems
A dichotomous measure of drug and alcohol problems is constructed from five indi-
cators that reflect the extent to which fathers engage in substance abuse: (1) con-
sumed three or more drinks on the same day in the past three months; (2) reported
alcohol use in the past month—every day, several times per week, or several times
per month; (3) reported drug use in the past month—every day, several times per
week, or several times per month; (4) reported that drinking or drug use interfered
with work or personal relationships in the past year; and (5) sought help or treat-
ment for drug or alcohol problems. The measure of alcohol and drug problems is
scored yes if the father replies affirmatively to any one of the five indicators
described above.
3. Parental Psychopathology
History of parental psychopathology is assessed for both the father’s father and the
father’s mother. A continuous measure is constructed from a battery of questions
asked retrospectively of Fragile Families men about their parents. The questions,
derived from the National Comorbidity Study, concern the respondent’s father’s and
mother’s histories of depression, anxiety, alcohol use, drug use, and suicide.
Responses to these questions are simply summed, producing a scale from 0 (no
affirmative answers to any of the questions) to 12 (affirmative responses to all ques-
tions).
4. Intelligence Scale
An assessment of IQ is derived from the WAIS-R. The word association questions
provide a proxy for the respondent’s intelligence quotient. The full WAIS-R contains
11 separate tests grouped into performance and verbal scales. The subtest on simi-
larities is used to determine vocational ability, to assess adult intellectual ability in
the classroom, and to determine organic deficits. The Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study includes an abbreviated form of the similarities subtest and asks 8
of 10 word association questions. The father’s answers to the 8 questions are
summed in accordance with published documentation to construct a scale from 0
to 16.
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APPENDIX B: BALANCE DIAGNOSTICS
The following figures provide a display of the greater balance achieved through
propensity-score weighting, Figure B1 for the full sample and Figure B2 for cohab-
iters only. For each covariate listed on the left we display the standardized differ-
ence in means11 corresponding to each method—no weighting (open circles) and
weighting (solid dots)—and for each imputed data set (separate symbol for each).
Some of the variables have been redefined so that (with the exception of multiple
indicators that represent a multi-category variable such as race) more positive val-
ues of the covariate are associated with higher earnings—for instance, the indica-
tor for “bad health” was redefined as an indicator for “no bad health.”
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11 Where the standardized difference in means is defined as the difference in sample means between the
married (t) and unmarried (c) groups divided by the standard deviation in the unmarried group: $$.
Figure B1. Standardized difference in means for each covariate from Model 5 for both
weighted (solid dots) and unweighted (open circles) approaches, displayed as a separate
value for each imputed data set. This figure corresponds to the full sample.
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It is easy to discern from these figures that the weighting noticeably improved the
balance in means across the “treatment” (married versus unmarried) groups, partic-
ularly with regard to race, sex ratios, and whether the couple was cohabiting at base-
line. We see even more dramatic improvement in the cohabiting sample in Figure 1.
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Figure B2. Standardized difference in means for each covariate from Model 5 for both
weighted (solid dots) and unweighted (open circles) approaches, displayed as a separate
value for each imputed data set. This figure corresponds to the cohabiting sample.
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APPENDIX C: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION APPENDIX
The basic concepts underlying our multiple imputation strategy are as follows:
1. Impute the missing values using an appropriate model that incorporates ran-
dom variation. The 88 variables in our model were derived from three
sources: (1) fathers’ self-reports, (2) mothers’ self-reports, and (3) mothers’
reports of fathers.
2. Do this M times, producing M “complete” data sets. In our study, M  5; that
is, five complete case data sets were imputed.
3. Perform the desired analysis on each data set using standard complete-data
methods.
4. Average the values of the parameter estimates across the M samples to pro-
duce a single point estimate.
5. Calculate the standard errors by (a) averaging the squared standard errors of
the M estimates, (b) calculating the variance of the M parameter estimates
across samples, and (c) combining the two quantities using a simple formula.
Standard errors that account for inter– and intra–data set variation were com-
puted according to the rules laid out by Rubin (1987).
The multiple imputation computations were implemented in Stata (Royston,
2004) using the multivariate imputation by chained equations (MICE) method of
multiple multivariate imputation described by van Burren, Boshuizen, and Knock
(1999). The application in Stata was developed by Patrick Royston (2004).
Table C1 shows the overall response rates for fathers at each of the first three
waves of data. The baseline response rate for all fathers is 78 percent and, while the
rate remains stable between the one-year and three-year interviews, it is about 10
percentage points lower than at baseline. This pattern is similar for both married
and unmarried fathers—about 89 percent for married fathers and 75 percent for
unmarried fathers.
Regarding the 88 variables in the MI model, roughly one-fourth to one-third of
the data are imputed across all father-reported variables. By contrast, similar pro-
portions of missing data are found for only one-third of the mother-reported vari-
ables. For the remaining two-thirds, only 10 percent of the data are missing. The
number of missing variables per observation ranges from a high of 80 percent for
one observation to complete data for 15 percent of the 4,898 observations. Fully half
of the observations have eight or fewer missing variables, while for the 10 percent of
fathers at the high end of the missingness scale, one-third to one-half of the vari-
ables in the model are imputed. To illustrate, Table C2 shows the percentage of mul-
tiply imputed data for each variable in our cross-sectional and differenced models
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics for these models).
Table C1. Scope of missing data.
Percentage of Fathers Interviewed
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Full sample 78 69 67
Married 89 81 81
Unmarried 75 65 63
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To examine the sensitivity of the results to the method of imputation, we esti-
mated our first two sets of models, the cross-sectional and difference equations,
using both complete case and multiply imputed samples. For the most part, the dif-
ferences between these two strategies were not substantial and in no case did they
alter statistical significance. These results are available upon request from the
authors
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Table C2. Percent of data multiply imputed for cross-sectional and differenced variables.
Married Unmarried
(N  582) All (N  2,260) Cohabit (N  847)
Cross-Sectional Strategy
Outcome Variable
3-Year earnings 36 36 25
Covariates
Age 15 17 11
Race 15 17 12
U.S. born 15 17 11
Region 0 0 0
Education 34 30 19




3-year earnings 36 36 25
Baseline earnings 22 25 18
Covariates
Additional Education 39 46 48
Additional Training 38 37 27
Marriage: Cause or Mere Indicator of Future Earnings Growth?
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Table D1. Cross-section and differenced estimates of the marriage differential at 3 years





White 0.28 (0.35) 0.13 (0.35) 0.05 (0.36) 0.03 (0.36)
Black 0.77 (0.30) 0.27 (0.26) 0.60 (0.30) 0.11 (0.24)
Hispanic 0.07 (0.29) 0.17 (0.30) 0.10 (0.32) 0.04 (0.27)
Observations 2,842 2,842 1,163 1,163
R-Squared 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00
Table D2. Effects of marriage on year-5 (log) earnings by race (WBH) for regression and
propensity score strategies (corresponds to Figure 2) (standard errors in parentheses)
Set (A) Set (A)  (B) Set (A)  (B)  (C)
Model p-Score Regression p-Score Regression p-Score Regression
Full Sample
White 0.42 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.11 0.22
(0.39) (0.51) (0.44) (0.39) (0.50) (0.38)
Black 0.46 0.16 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.34
(0.36) (0.37) (0.49) (0.28) (0.48) (0.28)
Hispanic 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.15
(0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Observations 2,669 2,669 2,602 2,669 2,602 2,669
R-Squared 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
Cohabiters
White 0.33 0.38 0.17 0.30 0.17 0.31
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.53) (0.45)
Black 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.16
(0.39) (0.34) (0.45) (0.31) (0.42) (0.30)
Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12
(0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28)
Observations 1,581 1,581 1,558 1,581 1,558 1,581
R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17
APPENDIX D: TABLES CORRESPONDING TO THE INFORMATION DISPLAYED IN FIGURES 2,
3, AND 4
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Table D3. Impact of adjustment for additional baseline confounding covariates on cross-
section (dot) and difference (triangle) estimates of the effect of marriage on year-3 (log)
earnings (corresponds to Figure 3) (standard errors in parentheses).
Set (A) Set (A)  (B) Set (A)  (B)  (C)
Cross- Cross- Cross-
Model Section Differenced Section Differenced Section Differenced
Full Sample
White 0.28 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.34)
Black 0.77 0.27 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54
(0.30) (0.26) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Hispanic 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.29) (0.30) (0.32) (0.25) (0.32) (0.25)
Observations 2,842 2,842 2,842 2,842 2,842 2,842
R-Squared 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.38 0.15 0.38
Cohabiters
White 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13
Black (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)
0.60 0.11 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.40
Hispanic (0.30) (0.24) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28)
0.10 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11
(0.32) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26)
Observations 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163 1,163
R-Squared 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.43 0.18 0.43
Marriage: Cause or Mere Indicator of Future Earnings Growth?
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management DOI: 10.1002/pam
Published on behalf of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 
APPENDIX E: TEMPORAL ORDERING OF VARIABLES USED IN EACH ANALYSIS STRATEGY
Baseline 1 year 3 years 5 years


















Figure E1. Temporal Ordering of Variables Used in Each Analysis Strategy.
